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Abstract 
Japan experienced high growth of TFP following World War II. This paper studies 
the sources of this technological growth and documents the role played by different 
government policies in achieving such growth. We find that in non-agricultural sectors, 
TFP growth occurred at first through the import of foreign technologies via licensing, 
and subsequently through the innovation of its own technologies. In agriculture, TFP 
grew  mostly  through  the  development  of  its  own  technologies.  The  Japanese 
government played a part in the growth of TFP by directing the adoption of foreign 
technologies, promoting coordination of R&D activities, and setting up channels for the 
domestic diffusion of available technologies. 
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 1 
1. Introduction 
It is widely known that Japan experienced rapid economic growth in the late 1950s and 
1960s, when per capita gross domestic product grew at a remarkable rate of over 10 percent 
(Figure 1). There are numerous books and academic papers written on the reasons behind this 
success of the postwar Japanese economy. Some studies rely on descriptive macro-level statistics 
(Inada et al., 1993; Kosai and Kaminski, 1986; Minami, 1994; Nakamura, 1995; Ohkawa and 
Rosovsky, 1973) and others employ the growth accounting framework to decompose the high 
growth  rate  into  different  factors  (Denison  and  Chung,  1976;  Young,  1995;  Hayami  and 
Ogasawara, 1999, 2002; Yasuba, 2002). More recent works on the Japanese economy rely on 
modern calibration techniques to replicate the postwar rapid growth (Parente and Prescott, 2004; 
Chen, Imrohologlu, Imrohologlu, 2006; Braun, Ikeda and Joines, 2009; Braun, Esteban-Pretel, 
Okada and Sudou, 2006; Otsu, 2007).   
Figure 1: Japan’s Gross Domestic Product per capita 
 
      Source: Professor Angus Maddison’s Database <http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/>. 
There  is  an  emerging  consensus  both  in  the  growth-accounting  studies,  such  as  Young 
(1995) and Hayami and Ogasawara (1999), and in the calibration works, such as Otsu (2007) and 
Esteban-Pretel and Sawada (2009), that Japan’s postwar rapid growth was driven by a high 
growth rate of total factor productivity (TFP). These studies, while careful in their analysis and 
accurate in their results, assume that the evolution of TFP is exogenous to their models, and, thus, 
do  not  address  questions  related  to  the  sources  of  the  high  rates  of  TFP  growth.  However, 
uncovering the determinants of TFP growth is important, especially when studying government 2 
policies, since some of these policies could have affected the economy by influencing TFP. 
This paper studies the main forces behind the high growth of Japanese TFP in the postwar 
period, and the role that the government played in the evolution of Japanese technology. To do so, 
we first review the growth literature and expose the main determinants of long-run growth and 
development, and the diffusion of new technologies. We show that the determinants of TFP are 
multi-faceted. Theoretically, the level of TFP and its growth may be determined by endogenous 
human capital investment decisions, international technological transfers, firms’ research and 
development decisions, or government support to research and development (R&D) activities, as 
well as to agricultural research and extension (R&E) activities. 
For the case of postwar Japan, we argue that it is necessary to analyze the evolution of TFP 
for the agricultural and non-agricultural sector separately. This is due to the changing level of 
economic  development  of  the  Japanese  economy  in  the  postwar  period,  and  the  initial 
importance of the agricultural sector, both in the share of employment and total output, right after 
the war. 
We show that, for the non-agricultural sector, technology improvement in the early years 
following WWII started with the import and licensing of specific foreign technologies. With time, 
the adoption of foreign technologies was gradually replaced by the development of Japan’s own 
domestic technologies. We argue that the government played a role in both stages, although it is 
not always clear whether the influence was positive or negative. In terms of the adoption phase, 
the main impact of the government was through heavily regulating the number and types of 
technologies which companies were allowed to license and import from foreign firms. As for the 
phase of the development of new technologies, the stage in which the Japanese economy is still 
immersed,  the  government  has  not  contributed  as  much  as  governments  in  other  developed 
countries in terms of expenditures. However, it is argued that its main influence has been through 
the establishment of R&D consortia, and by not affecting the R&D industry with distortionary 
subsidy systems, and finally by not strengthening patent laws. 
The agricultural sector followed a different process than the non-agricultural sector. Due to 
the difficulties associated with adopting agricultural technologies by countries with very different 
climates and landscapes, TFP in this sector has been mostly increasing due to the development of 
own technologies. The role of the Japanese government in the growth of TFP in the agricultural 
sector was primarily through the promotion of R&E activities, which helped the implementation 
and diffusion of many locally developed technologies. It also played a role in the development of 3 
high-yield varieties of farm products, which have been argued to be crucial to the growth of 
agricultural TFP. 
In  terms  of  the  domestic  diffusion  of  technologies  within  Japan,  both  for  the  case  of 
imported and locally developed ones, the main factors that explain this are the high level of 
human capital of the population, the quality and quantity of infrastructures, and a patent system 
that facilitated imitation. The Japanese government played an important part in all of these, both 
by providing financial support and the necessary organizational infrastructure. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the main theories and 
empirical  studies  on  the  development  and  diffusion  of  new  technologies.  In  Section  3  we 
decompose aggregate Japanese TFP into agricultural and non-agricultural sectors, and explain 
their  main  characteristics.  In  Section  4,  we  present  evidence  of  technology  adoption  and 
innovation in postwar Japan in the non-agricultural sector. Section 5 discusses the determinants 
of agricultural TFP. In Section 6 we focus on the domestic diffusion of technology. Finally, 
Section 7 summarizes and concludes. 
2. Development and diffusion of new technologies: A review of theories 
In this section we provide an overview of different theories and empirical studies that have 
been put forward in the literature to explain the growth and development of technology, as well 
as its diffusion across countries.
1 
2.1. Technological Growth 
One of the workhorses of many macroeconomic models with growth is the neoclassical 
growth model developed by Solow (1956) and Swan (1956). The model assumes a production 
function with constant returns to scale and diminishing productivity of each input, and a constant 
savings rate. Cass (1965) and Koopmans (1965) introduced consumption optimization into the 
Solow-Swan model, which provided an endogenously determined savings rate. The neoclassical 
growth  model,  while  standard  and  used  in  many  types  of  analysis,  assumes  that  long-run 
economic  growth  is  exogenous  to  the  decisions  of  the  agents  and  driven  by  exogenous 
technological progress. 
During  the  second  half  of  the  1980s  several  models  were  developed  to  endogenize  the 
                                                   
1  For a more comprehensive review of the economic growth and technological diffusion literatures, see 
Aghion and Howitt (1988), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004) and Keller (2004). 4 
growth rate of the economy. Papers such as Romer (1986), Lucas (1988) and Rebelo (1991) 
build models where different Marshallian externalities deliver endogenous long-run growth. In 
Romer (1986) firms use an increasing returns to scale production function, where knowledge is 
accumulated through the investment in private capital, which in turn increases the aggregate 
level of knowledge in the economy and fosters economic growth. Lucas (1988) and Rebelo 
(1991) build models where the production of final output involves the use of both physical and 
human capital. Human capital is accumulated over time with the use of previously available 
human  capital,
2  and  is  readily  available  in  the  economy.  This  externality  is  what  delivers 
endogenous  growth  in  these  two  models.  The  implication  of  the  existence  of  knowledge 
spillovers  in  these  endogenous  growth  models  is  that  the  decentralized  equilibrium  is  not 
efficient, since it fails to internalize the benefits of private investment in physical or human 
capital in the aggregate knowledge in the economy. These models, while producing endogenous 
long-run  economic  growth,  still  do  not  address  the  core  question  of  what  lies  beneath  the 
development of new technologies and its diffusion across countries. However, it was not long 
before models addressing these issues were built. 
Models  of  technological  development  can  be  broadly  split  into  two  categories:  (i)  new 
variety  models;  and  (ii)  quality  ladder  models.  Both  types  of  models  deliver  endogenous 
technological progress through the investment of firms in research and development (R&D), 
which is translated into new technologies that are used by final output producing firms. Since the 
creation of new technologies involves an ex-ante sunken cost in R&D, it is crucial to assume that 
research firms are granted some kind of monopoly over such technologies, so that firms have 
incentive to undertake the research investment.   
A pioneer in the models of expanding varieties is Romer (1990). In his model, research firms 
incur  the  cost  of  developing  new  varieties  of  intermediate  goods,  which  are  sold  in 
monopolistically  competitive  markets at  a  premium  over  the  marginal  cost  to  the  firms  that 
produce the final output. The creation of new varieties, which is interpreted as new technologies, 
delivers or affects growth in two ways. First, it directly increases the level of technology used in 
current production, and second, it eases the creation of future new technologies, which build on 
existing knowledge. 
Two main references of quality ladder models are Aghion and Howitt (1992), Grossman and 
Helpman (1991). These models consider that the number of varieties is fixed, and attribute the 
                                                   
2  In the case of Rebelo (1991), physical capital is used to produce human capital. 5 
growth of technology of the economy to increases in the quality of the existing number of goods. 
As in the case of expanding varieties models, research firms incur the cost of developing the new 
technologies, which they sell over the marginal cost to recover the sunken investment. However, 
these models have the property that every time an improvement in the quality of a good occurs, a 
Schumpeterian  creative  destruction  effect  takes  place.  The  development  of  higher  quality 
products makes the previous goods with lower quality obsolete, and therefore destroys the value 
of existing firms.   
There  is  another  less-known  strand  of  literature  that  hypothesizes  that  technological 
innovations are driven by the scarcity of production factors. This hypothesis, which has come to 
be known as the induced technological innovation hypothesis, was first formulated by Hicks 
(1932)  and  further  developed  by  Hayami  and  Ruttan  (1971  and  1985)  in  the  context  of 
agricultural technological innovations. These models show that innovations are directed toward 
technologies  that  use  smaller  amounts  of  relatively  scarce  resources.  The  reason  is  that  the 
scarcity of factors of production impacts the relative price of inputs and has a clear effect on the 
incentives for innovation on certain technologies that save such scarce inputs. In this context, 
Binswanger (1974) formalized the induced technological innovation theory using the duality 
framework.   
Due  to  the  fact  that  the  development  of  new  technologies  affects  the  pace  of  future 
technology growth, as in the new variety models, or destroys the profits of existing firms, as in 
the quality ladder models, the decentralized equilibrium is in general not efficient. This leaves 
room for government interventions to bring the economy to the social optimum. One clear policy 
is the promotion of research activities, which can be implemented by subsidizing the cost of 
R&D for firms, or directly performing the research through government institutions, such as 
research centers and universities. Other policies that the government can introduce include the 
sponsorship of the new technologies by firms through subsidies to their adoption costs, or the 
subsidization of the cost of final goods, since their production requires intermediate goods that 
use  the  new  technologies.  Since  the  excludability  of  ideas  provides  the  right  incentives  for 
innovations in the Romer (1990) model, the enforcement of the property rights of new patents is 
essential  in  the  previous  theoretical  frameworks.  Hence,  this  is  clearly  an  area  where  the 
government plays an important role.   6 
2.2. Technological Diffusion 
While technological improvement is crucial for the growth of an economy, many countries 
do not develop new technologies themselves. Instead, they import and adopt technologies created 
abroad,  and  it  is  this  absorption  of  foreign  technologies  that  allows  them  to  grow.  This  is 
particularly  true  for  developing  countries  where  a  major  source  of  technological  progress  is 
import of advanced technologies from developed economies (Hayami and Godo, 2005, p. 188). 
The  economic  literature  has  pointed  out  several  channels  of  international  diffusion  of 
technologies. Some of the most important ones are international trade, foreign direct investment, 
licensing  and  imitation.  Each  of  these  channels  affects  the  manner  and  speed  in  which 
technology spreads and is adopted in the different countries. 
International  trade  diffuses  the  available  technologies  through  the  goods  that  a  country 
imports. New technologies can be imported and used as intermediate inputs in the production 
process, which generates the improvement of the overall technological level of the economy. The 
introduction of new technologies by importing technologically advanced goods may be much 
less costly than the local development, or even production of such products, thereby providing 
countries that are not on the technology frontier with access to such advanced products, and the 
growth associated with them. Eaton and Kortum (2001 and 2002) are prime examples of papers 
with models in which trade provides access to foreign technologies through imported goods. In 
their  model,  trade  expands  the  production  possibility  frontier  of  the  country  and  delivers 
economic growth. The empirical literature (e.g. Coe and Helpman, 1995; Coe et al., 1997; Xu 
and Wang, 1999) shows that while imports of intermediate goods (especially capital) seem to be 
important for the diffusion of technology, exports do not seem to play an important role.   
Foreign direct investment (FDI) has long been considered as a major determinant of the 
international diffusion of technology. In this literature, some studies (e.g. Markusen, 2002) show 
how technology may flow from one country to another when multinational corporations use 
firm-specific technologies in local subsidiaries. Other studies, such as Fosfuri et al. (2001), stress 
the role of training at big international firms as an important way to spread knowledge to the 
countries where the FDI takes place.   
Another way in which countries can have access to foreign technologies is through the direct 
licensing  of  such  technologies.  Companies  can  pay  for  the  right  to  use  specific  techniques, 
processes or machinery in their own production lines. The capability of using the most advanced 7 
technologies gives these firms the ability to produce at the maximum capacity, and grants them 
an edge over the competition, allowing the economy to grow beyond the domestic possibilities. 
One  final  and  important  way  in  which  technology  moves  around  and  gets  adopted,  is 
through  imitation.  While  the  imitation  of  products  requires  some  degree  of  research  and 
development, the cost of imitation is normally lower than the cost of innovation, and therefore, 
many companies and countries that are not on the technological frontier use this. Barro and 
Sala-i-Martin (1997) build a model of imitation, where property rights are not internationally 
enforced, and firms in the country which is the follower are able to extract the benefits from the 
leader’s firms by imitating their technologies and selling them in the local market. 
Many  factors  have  been  argued  to  affect  the  level,  speed  and  channel  through  which 
technology is diffused across countries. Some of the most important factors are the economic 
differences between the country of origin and the receiving one, the level of R&D and the cost of 
imitation in the receiving economy, and the level of human capital, both in absolute terms and 
relative to the country where the technology is developed. 
Differences  in  the  levels  of  economic  development,  quality  of  institutions,  culture, 
geographical distance, climate or educational level of the population, are crucial determinants of 
the costs for companies, both foreign and local, to set up FDI, license technologies, or imitate 
existing technologies. Several empirical studies (e.g. Jaffe et al., 1993; Branstetter, 2001; Eaton 
and Kortum, 1999) find that technological diffusion occurs faster and more frequently within a 
given country, where the previous differences are small, than across countries, where they are 
likely to be big, especially with distantly located, less developed countries.   
The  level  of  human  capital  and  of  R&D  expenditures  has  also  been  emphasized  as  a 
necessary condition for the diffusion of technology. The idea is that for a country to be able to 
import,  adapt  and  absorb  new  technologies,  it  must  have  a  certain  stock  of  knowledge  and 
technology. The work of Eaton and Kortum (1996), Xu (2000), and Benhabib and Spiegel (2005) 
shows  that  without  basic  know-how  and  the  ability  to  learn  and  adapt  more  advanced 
technologies, technological diffusion is much more difficult and less likely to take place. 
The  previous  factors  are  not  only  important  for  the  dissemination  of  technology  across 
countries,  but  they  also  play  a  crucial  role  in  diffusing  technologies  within  a  country.  The 
theoretical models reviewed above, as well as most of the other existing models in the literature, 
assume that once a new technology is developed or imported, it is instantaneously available for 8 
use at other firms in the same country. However, in reality the domestic diffusion of technology 
is also affected by the factors stated above, as well as by other factors such as the level of 
infrastructure of the economy. 
Given  the  previous  channels  and  factors  that  determine  international  and  domestic 
technology transfers, there are several policies that governments could institute to increase the 
rate of such diffusion. Some of these policies include the promotion of education to facilitate the 
absorption of knowledge, the subsidization of research and development to incentive firms to 
imitate and adapt existing technologies, the enforcement of patent laws if the objective is to 
attract FDI, and the negotiation and help for the licensing of key technologies. 
3. Evidence on overall Japanese TFP and its sectoral decomposition   
As the models discussed in the previous section emphasize, the innovation and adoption of 
new technologies are the two key driving forces of the TFP growth. The following sections 
review how new technologies were created and diffused, and how the government facilitated 
these processes in the Japanese postwar economy. 
When the Second World War (WWII) ended in 1945, the Japanese economy found itself far 
behind  the  technology  frontier  of  the  world.  In  1964,  the  Agency  of  Industrial  Science  and 
Technology, which was in charge of industrial research and development under the Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry (MITI), looked back at the 1940s and 1950s and wrote: “The 
technology gap between Japan and the advanced countries in the prewar period was preserved, 
and it further expanded due to the vacuum of technology adoption during the war” (Agency of 
Industrial Science and Technology, 1964). Indeed, in 1952 the productivity gap between Japan 
and U.S. was substantial in the early postwar period. According to the estimate by Christensen et 
al. (1995), Japanese TFP was as low as 43% of that of the U.S. However, the productivity of the 
Japanese economy increased rapidly after that, and it became 80% of that of the U.S. in the early 
1970s, when the high growth came to an end (Figure 2).   9 
Figure 2: Productivity of Japan relative to the U.S. 
 
Source: Christensen, Cummings and Jorgenson (1995), pp.316-320. 
In the following sections, we divide the economy into the agricultural and non-agricultural 
sectors. The reason behind this division is two-fold. First, right after WWII, the share of output 
and employment in the agricultural sector was more than 50%. As is shown in Esteban-Pretel and 
Sawada (2009) accounting for the structural change that took place in Japan in the postwar 
period is essential to understand the rapid growth era. During a structural change process, TFP 
growth, or more precisely, labor productivity growth in the agricultural sector is an important 
determinant of economic growth. In models with non-homothetic preferences (e.g. Eswaran and 
Kotwal,  1993;  Gollin,  Parente,  and  Rogerson,  2007;  Esteban-Pretel  and  Sawada,  2009), 
households first consume the subsistence level of food that is essential for their survival, and 
then  consume  other  goods  such  as  manufacturing  goods  or  services.  In  such  models,  if 
agricultural TFP level is low, even if the TFP level in the non-agricultural sector is high, the 
economy needs to allocate a large fraction of resources to unproductive food production, which 
reduces economic growth.   
Second,  while  the  adoption  of  foreign  technologies  in  the  manufacturing  sector  is 
widespread  and  has  been  documented  for  many  developing  economies,  the  international 
diffusion of agricultural technologies is often very difficult due to differences in climate and 
other farming conditions. As we discuss later, given these difficulties, the Japanese agricultural 
sector was forced to innovate independently, while in the other economic sectors the adoption of 10 
foreign technologies was more common, at least right after WWII.   
Figure 3: Sectoral Total Factor Productivity 
 
Source: Esteban-Pretel and Sawada (2009) dataset. Note: Labor input is total hours. 
Figure  3  shows  the  evolution  of  TFP  in  the  agricultural  and  non-agricultural  sectors  in 
postwar Japan. We can observe that both TFP series increase significantly until the first oil crisis, 
although the growth rate of non-agricultural TFP was significantly higher than that of agriculture.   
In order to further understand the relative contribution of the sector-specific TFP to the 
overall TFP level, we decompose aggregate TFP, A, into four components: Agricultural TFP, Aa, 
non-agricultural TFP, Am, and the contribution of the reallocation of capital and labor. We follow 
Syrquin (1984) and Basu and Fernald (2002) and decompose aggregate TFP as follows: 
 
where K is capital; L is labor; r and w are capital and labor returns, respectively; sVi, sKi, and sLi 
are the nominal value added share, capital share, and labor share of sector i, respectively.    Note 
that variables without subscripts denote aggregate levels, and those with subscripts are those in 
the agriculture (a) or non-agriculture (m) sectors. The final two terms on the right-hand side of 
the previous equation are the ‘growth bonus’ effect arising from reallocating capital and labor 
from a low to a high marginal productivity sector. When capital or labor are reallocated to a 
sector with higher marginal product, the third and fourth terms are positive. We refer to these last 
two terms as the capital and labor reallocation effects. 11 
Table 1 shows the decomposition of aggregate TFP for various subperiods starting in 1956. 
We can see that the main contributors to aggregate TFP growth are non-agricultural TFP and the 
reallocation of labor. Both terms are high during the rapid growth era, from 1956 to 1973. The 
importance of the labor reallocation effect is consistent with the findings of Hayashi and Prescott 
(2008) and Esteban-Pretel and Sawada (2009), which show that the elimination of migration 
barriers from rural to urban areas can be seen as one of the important determinants for Japan’s 
postwar economic miracle.
3  The contribution of agricultural TFP is low, which is partly due to 
the declining share of agricultural production in total output over the period of study.   
Table 1. TFP Decomposition   
  Aggregate 
TFP 




1956-73  4.78%  0.11%  3.96%  0.05%  0.66% 
1973-83  0.50%  0.00%  0.25%  0.04%  0.21% 
1983-91  2.26%  -0.01%  2.13%  0.01%  0.13% 
1991-2000  0.17%  -0.01%  0.09%  0.01%  0.08% 
Source: Esteban-Pretel and Sawada (2009) dataset. Note: Labor input is total hours. 
4. Technology adoption and innovation in the non-agricultural sector 
The previous section showed the importance of non-agricultural TFP in the overall growth 
of  aggregate  TFP.  We  now  move  to  study  the  way  this  high  increase  of  non-agricultural 
technology occurred in Japan.   
As explained in Section 2, for countries that are on the technology frontier the development 
and innovation of new products and techniques precedes the process of international diffusion. 
However, for a country like Japan in the early postwar period, the order of these processes was 
reversed.  Initially  Japan  relied  on  imported  foreign  technologies,  and  later  started  the 
development of its own technologies. This sequence, which is also observed in other countries 
                                                   
3  Mundlak and Strauss (1978) show that income differentials between the agriculture and 
non-agricultural sectors were important in determining the rate of migration out of the agricultural sector 
in Japan. 12 
that are not the technology leaders, can be clearly seen in Figure 4. The ratio of net technology 
imports to GNP, which was initially high, has declined gradually over time. Simultaneous into 
this decline, Japan experienced a rise in the ratio of R&D expenditures to GNP. This indicates 
that  over  time  Japan  substituted  the  import  and  adoption  of  foreign  technologies  for  the 
development of their own. We now study these two processes in more detail. 
 
Figure 4: Adoption and Innovation of Technology 
 
Source: Science and Technology Agency (1972, 1974, and 1991) and SNA. Note: The left axis is for 
“net technology import/GNP,” while the right is for “R&D/GNP.” 
4.1. Technology adoption 
As can be seen in Figure 2, the technology gap between Japan and the U.S. was greatly 
reduced during the 1950s and 1960s. Furthermore the high growth of Japanese TFP was mostly 
due to the growth of non-agricultural TFP. A major driving force of this rapid technological 
progress in the decades following WWII was the adoption of foreign technologies. Figure 5 
shows the trend of technology adoptions quantified by the number of “Type A” technological 
assistance contracts, i.e., contracts whose terms were longer than one year, from 1950 to 1979. 
While the number of technology adoptions per year was around 100 until 1959, it increased to 
around 2,000 by the late 1960s. Breaking down these numbers by industry, we find that they 
concentrated  in  a  few  industries,  i.e.  chemical  products,  general  machinery  and  electric 
machinery, from the 1950s to the 1970s (Table 2). The proportion of these three industries was 13 
62% in the 1950s and 1960s. 














Number             
Total  454    575    2,039    3,926    8,295    7,846   
Chemical products  82    116    280    678    1,048    808   
Petrochemical plant engineering  0    19    38    73    82    92   
Petroleum and coal products  15    17    24    73    217    84   
Iron, steel and non-ferrous metals  38    56    96    181    201    147   
Fabricated metal products  6    20    74    124    225    217   
General machinery  98    120    589    1,021    1,973    1,759   
Transportation equipment  42    34    94    209    438    391   
Precision instruments and machinery  0    8    48    125    261    304   
Electric machinery  108    109    469    664    1,251    1,451   
Food and tobacco  0    1    8    58    260    151   
Textile products  24    33    83    172    794    1,060   
Ceramic, stone and clay products  10    8    45    81    206    134   
Plastic products  1    5    94    209    403    187   
Others  30    29    97    258    936    1,061   
Percentage             
Total  100.0    100.0    100.0    100.0    100.0    100.0   
Chemical products  18.1    20.2    13.7    17.3    12.6    10.3   
Petrochemical plant engineering  0.0    3.3    1.9    1.9    1.0    1.2   
Petroleum and coal products  3.3    3.0    1.2    1.9    2.6    1.1   
Iron, steel and non-ferrous metals  8.4    9.7    4.7    4.6    2.4    1.9   
Fabricated metal products  1.3    3.5    3.6    3.2    2.7    2.8   
General machinery  21.6    20.9    28.9    26.0    23.8    22.4   
Transportation equipment  9.3    5.9    4.6    5.3    5.3    5.0   
Precision instruments and machinery  0.0    1.4    2.4    3.2    3.1    3.9   
Electric machinery  23.8    19.0    23.0    16.9    15.1    18.5   
Food and tobacco  0.0    0.2    0.4    1.5    3.1    1.9   
Textile products  5.3    5.7    4.1    4.4    9.6    13.5   
Ceramic, stone and clay products  2.2    1.4    2.2    2.1    2.5    1.7   
Plastic products  0.2    0.9    4.6    5.3    4.9    2.4   
Others  6.6    5.0    4.8    6.6    11.3    13.5   14 
Source: Science and Technology Agency ed. (1980). 
Figure 5: Technology imports 
(Number of Type A technological assistance contracts) 
 
This  large  contribution  of  imported  technologies  to  the  postwar  Japanese  economic 
development is widely accepted in the preceding studies. For example, Peck and Tamura (1976) 
characterize the postwar Japanese technological development as one with “high returns from 
importing technology in terms of exports and productivity.” Goto and Odagiri (1996) point out 
that Japan efficiently utilized the channels of technology transfer such as import of machinery 
and equipment, purchase of technology and technological services. Figure 6 is a scatter diagram 
between technology adoptions and productivity growth by industry. The horizontal axis denotes 
the number of technological adoptions from 1955 to 1969, normalized by average real value 
added in 1955 and 1970, while the vertical axis denotes the productivity growth from 1955 to 
1970 (TFP in Panel (a) and labor productivity in Panel (b)). We can clearly observe a positive 
correlation between technology adoption and growth, both for TFP and labor productivity. 
The impact of the technology adoptions on the different industries, suggested in Figure 6, 
has been well documented in the literature. Previous work on the industrial development of 
postwar  Japan  is  full  of  anecdotes  about  the  positive  effects  of  technology  imports  (e.g. 
Committee for Foreign Technology Survey, 1961; Agency of Industrial Science and Technology, 
1964; Society for Industrial Studies, 1995; Yonekawa et al. eds, 1990-1991; Kohama, 2001). In 
particular, the Committee for Foreign Technology Survey (1961) comprehensively describes the 15 
technology  imports  by  individual  industries  and  their  impacts  in  the  early  stage  of  postwar 
growth. Let us briefly look at the cases of electric machinery, automobiles, and the iron and steel, 
which,  relying  on  the  Committee  for  Foreign  Technology  Survey  (1961),  became  the  major 
export industries of Japan. 
Figure 6: Technology adoption and productivity growth by industry 
 
Source: Economic and Social Research Institute of Cabinet Office (2001) and Economic Research 
Institute of Economic Planning Agency(1998). 
Electric machinery is usually sub-divided into “heavy electric machinery” and “light electric 
machinery.” The former is composed of investment goods for electricity companies, while the 
latter  encompasses  consumption  goods  for  households.  With  respect  to  the  heavy  electric 
machinery, three of the major companies, Toshiba, Mitsubishi Electric and Fuji Electric, entered 
into  comprehensive  technology  adoption  contracts  with  GE,  Westinghouse  and  Siemens, 
respectively in the early 1950s. Other major companies also adopted individual technologies. 
One of the most remarkable results of these contracts was that the Japanese electric machinery 
companies became able to produce thermal generators of large capacity. In the early 1950s, the 
Japanese electric companies started to shift from hydroelectric generation to thermal generation. 
It was for that purpose that they imported advanced thermal generators larger that 200 thousand 
KW each, which the Japanese electric machinery companies could not produce. Owing to the 
technology adoptions in the early 1950s, the Japanese electric machinery companies acquired the 
ability to produce these advanced thermal generators. 
Concerning the light electric machinery, technology adoptions created a new industry, i.e. 
the  television  set  industry.  TV  broadcasting  started  in  Japan  in  1953.  Since  research  and 
development  for  producing  TV  sets  was  suspended  during  the  war,  and  the  start  of  TV 16 
broadcasting occurred at a later time than in the advanced countries, the Japanese technology for 
TV production was substantially behind in the early 1950s. Many basic patents for TV sets were 
owned by foreign companies, in particular RCA, Westinghouse and EMI. Hence, more than 
thirty Japanese electric machinery companies entered into technology assistance contracts with 
these foreign companies in the early 1950s. While the cumulative number of TV sets produced in 
Japan until 1954 was 75 thousand, in 1959 alone, 2.9 million TV sets were produced, and out of 
those, 27 thousand sets were exported. 
The occupation authority (SCAP) allowed the production of automobiles in 1949, although 
at this time automobiles were just remodeled small trucks, whose performance was 10 to 20 
years behind the world standard. In the early 1950s, three major automobile companies, Nissan, 
Hino  and  Isuzu,  entered  into  technology  adoption  contracts  with  Austin  Motors,  Renault 
Corporation and Roots Motors, respectively. According to the contracts, information on design, 
specifications, materials, processing, and others, was provided to the Japanese companies, which 
enabled them to produce world-class automobiles. Furthermore, the technology adoption of these 
technologies introduced the mass production system based on transfer machines to the Japanese 
automobile industry.   
The iron and steel industry developed fairly well in Japan, but the technology for producing 
strip,  whose  demand  was  increasing  as  the  durable  consumption  goods  industry  developed, 
lagged  behind.  In  order  to  catch  up  with  the  advanced  countries,  MITI  and  iron  and  steel 
companies drew the “First Iron and Steel Rationalization Plan” in 1951, the focus of which was 
the construction of strip mills. Based on the plan, Fuji Iron Works and Yawata Iron Works, the 
two largest iron and steel companies in Japan, entered into technological assistance contracts 
with Armco Steel to obtain know-how on the design, construction and operation of strip mill 
factories. A similar contract was entered into between Kawasaki Iron Works and Republic Steel 
in 1958. The “First Iron and Steel Rationalization Plan” was followed by the “Second Iron and 
Steel Rationalization Plan” in 1956. The focus of the second plan was the introduction of the 
basic oxygen furnace (BOF), which was a substitute for the open hearth. In 1956, Nippon Kokan 
Corporation (NKK) acquired a general license in Japan with Alpine Co., and six other major 
Japanese steel companies acquired the sublicense of BOF from NKK in the late 1950s.   
There are few studies that quantitatively identify the effect of technology adoption in 1950s 
and 1960s Japan. Kiyota and Okazaki (2005) examine the effect of technology adoption on the 
firm’s performance using firm-level data from 1957 to 1970. They matched the complete list of 17 
individual technology adoptions by the firms listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange in that period 
with the financial data from the JDB database.    They analyze the impact of technology adoption 
on variables such as TFP, labor productivity, value added, capital-labor ratio, and R&D-sales 
ratio, one and three years after the technology is adopted. They find that in the 1950s, technology 
adoption had a positive impact on labor productivity, value-added, the capital-labor ratio and the 
R&D-sales ratio, although not on TFP. Furthermore, the impact faded in the 1960s. In a different 
study, Nakamura and Ohashi (2008) estimate the effect of the adoption of BOF technology on 
TFP, using plant-level data of the Japanese steel industry from 1957 to 1968. Based on the 
estimation of the production function with vintage capital, they revealed that the adoption of 
BOF raised the annual TFP growth rate of the steel industry from 7% (counter-factual) to 17% 
(actual). At the same time, they find that the learning effect was significant. That is, just after a 
plant introduced BOF, its TFP dropped 9% and it took two years until TFP reached the level 
achieved by the old open hearth technology. This learning effect also seems to be an explanation 
for the result of Kiyota and Okazaki (2005) that technology adoption did not have a positive 
impact on TFP. 
4.2. Policy framework for technology adoption 
The  Japanese  government  played  an  important  role  in  the  import  of  the  technologies 
described above by imposing a strict framework for such adoptions.
4  This policy framework, 
which  started  in  1950  with  the  enactment  of  the  Foreign  Investment  Law  and  had  mostly 
disappeared  by  1968,  was  intended  for  the  selective  adoption  of  what  were  thought  as  key 
technologies. Let us describe this framework in more detail. 
The 1950 Foreign Investment Law required advanced government approval of all “Type A” 
technological assistance contracts. By this approval system, the government aimed at selectively 
importing  technologies  that  would  contribute  to  Japan’s  balance  of  payments  and  the 
development of “important” and public industries. Meanwhile, the government guaranteed and 
protected the investments and contracts that were approved, and thereby intended to promote the 
adoption of desirable technology. 
In the late 1950s, requests for relaxing regulations on technology adoption were made by the 
domestic industries as well as these from foreign countries. The domestic industries were keen to 
adopt  more  technology  to  cope  with  the  trade  liberalization  expected  in  the  near  future. 
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Responding  to  these  requests,  the  government  simplified  the  examination  procedure  of 
technology  adoption  in  1959,  which  was  called  the  “new  method  for  capital  import.”  This 
measure was meant to be tentative until the more substantial deregulation, which was conducted 
in 1961.   
After the deregulation in 1961, technology adoptions were approved automatically, except 
for cases which were thought to be detrimental for the Japanese economy, while the government 
continued to examine each application of technology adoption. In 1968, the government finally 
ceased the individual examination process, except for certain cases, such as aircrafts, weapons, 
gun  powder,  and  nuclear  power.  In  other  words,  in  1968  the  government  intervention  in 
technology adoption was basically abolished. 
We can observe in Figure 5 several qualitative jumps in the amount of imported technologies. 
These jumps divide the sample period into the four phases generated by the deregulations of 
1959, 1961 and 1968. The numbers in Figure 5 suggest that the government regulation indeed 
affected technology adoptions in Japan. Studying the influence of such regulation of the number 
of imported technologies, Kiyota and Okazaki (2005) use firm-level data and find a negative 
impact  of  the  regulation  on  the  amount  of  technology  adoptions.  They  also  find  that  the 
government regulation affected the composition of the adopted technologies. Peck and Tamura 
(1976) points out that MITI gave priority to adopting technologies on intermediate and capital 
goods for heavy industries in the 1950s. The relatively high percentage of the chemical products 
and “iron, steel and non-ferrous metals” in the 1950s, which was the period under the rigid 
control, seems to reflect the priorities of MITI. 
The advantages and disadvantages of the government intervention in technology adoptions 
in Japan have been controversial. On one hand, Johnson (1982) and Lynn (1982 and 1998) 
highly evaluate the contribution of MITI’s control over technology adoptions. According to them, 
thanks  to  MITI’s  intervention,  the  Japanese  industries  were  able  to  obtain  cutting-edge 
technologies  at  lower  prices.  Their  rational  is  that  MITI’s  intervention  and  controlled 
competition among Japanese firms helped reduce the concerns of foreign technology suppliers, 
who otherwise may not have dealt with Japanese firms that did not have international reputations. 
Nakamura  and  Ohashi  (2008)  argue  that,  given  the  high  estimated  learning  costs  of  new 
technologies in the steel industry, MITI’s intervention encouraged Japanese steel companies to 
adopt the more productive BOF technology through the lowering of royalties. 
On  the  other  hand,  it  has  been  stressed  that  MITI’s  intervention  hindered  or  delayed 19 
competent Japanese firms from accessing foreign technologies. A case cited often is that of Sony 
in the early 1950s (Peck and Tamura 1976; Okimoto 1989; Goto and Odagiri 1996). It is said that 
Sony had to wait for two years until the adoption of the transistor technology from Western 
Electric was approved by MITI. This delay was due to MITI’s skepticism about the abilities of 
Sony, a small start-up firm at that time. This anecdote is consistent with MITI’s general policy in 
screening  applications  for  technology  adoption,  which  Kiyota  and  Okazaki  (2005)  revealed. 
They regressed the number of technology adoptions by a firm to its attributes including the 
cumulative  number  of  technologies  it  had  adopted,  and  found  that  the  coefficient  of  the 
cumulative number of adopted technologies is significantly positive in the 1950s, whereas it is 
around zero after the deregulation in the 1960s. This implies that MITI preferred approving 
technology adoption by experienced firms, and this had an unfavorable effect on competent 
start-up firms like Sony in the 1950s. 
4.3. Innovation of new technologies 
As the Japanese economy caught up with the other developed countries, it gradually shifted 
from  the  adoption  process,  where  firms  were  eager  to  absorb  foreign  technologies,  to  the 
innovation process, where they engaged in R&D investments more intensively to further increase 
the technology level.   
The R&D expenditure to GNP ratio in Japan increased from about 50% of the U.S. level in 
1961 to about the same level in 1989.
5  As in the case of the U.S., around 40% of the R&D 
expenditure in Japan is used for basic and applied research, and the remaining is used for the 
development of new products.
6  Firms’ activities in R&D also contributed to the development of 
science. Two Japanese Nobel laureates in the natural sciences were corporate researchers when 
they achieved their scientific breakthroughs. 
One  of  the  characteristics  of  R&D  in  Japan  is  that  the  government’s  share  of  R&D 
expenditure is the lowest among the developed countries, whereas the industry’s share is the 
highest.  Table  3  shows  that  while  the  U.S  government  provided  around  50%  of  R&D 
expenditures  in  1988,  the  Japanese  government  only  provided  around  20%.  Japanese  firms 
accounted for almost all the remaining expenditures, 74%. At the user level, however, Japan’s 
R&D expenditures are similar to those of other developed countries. 
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4.4. Policies on technology innovation 
One of the implications of the endogenous growth theory reviewed in Section 2 is that R&D 
investment  is  lower  in  laissez-faire  economies  than  the  social  optimum.  This  is  due  to  the 
existence  of  externalities  and  imperfect  competition  arising  naturally  from 
increasing-returns-to-scale  technologies.  Such  externalities  justify  the  intervention  of  the 
government through policies such as the provision of financial incentives via subsidies and tax 
benefits to the R&D investment, or the strengthening of patent rights. 
Table 3: Decomposition of R&D expenditure 
(Share in total R&D expenditure in each country) 
  Government  Industry  University  Private laboratory 
  Provider  User  Provider  User  Provider  User  Provider  User 
Japan (1988)  18.4%  9.3%  76.3%  73.9%  4.5%  12.6%  0.7%  4.3% 
U.S. (1988)  48.0%  11.5%  47.9%  71.8%  2.8%  13.8%  1.4%  2.9% 
West Germany (1987)  36.6%  3.4%  62.3%  73.1%  -  12.9%  -  10.6% 
France (1983)  53.8%  26.4%  42.0%  56.8%  0.2%  15.9%  0.4%  0.9% 
U.K. (1987)  38.7%  15.1%  49.7%  67.0%  0.6%  14.2%  1.9%  3.7% 
Source: Westney (1994) (originally taken from Science and Technology Agency, 1990). 
As we see in Table 3, the Japanese government’s subsidies for R&D investments are much 
smaller  than  those  in  other  developed  countries.  Moreover, a ccording  to  Okimoto  (1989), 
specific tax incentives, such as the one for R&D investment are also small compared with the 
U.S.
7 
The previous evidence seems to suggest that the Japanese government did not pursue the 
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annual rate in a corporation’s past, up to a ceiling of 10 percent of the corporation’s taxes. The United 
States, by contrast, allows tax credits of 25 percent for all R&D expenditures exceeding the average over 
the preceding over the preceding three years; there is no ceiling on the amount that is deducible and the 
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pro-incentive policies to correct market failures as is suggested by the endogenous growth theory. 
The fact that such policies can easily generate an excuse for pork-barrel spending, might be one 
of the reasons why R&D policies in Japan were relatively free from distortions arising from 
government failures. According to Okimoto (1989), MITI has traditionally refused to protect 
depressed industries. While in the U.S. the declining sectors tend to be the biggest beneficiaries 
of  tax  exceptions,  this  tendency  is  weaker  in  Japan.  These  relatively  non-distortionary  tax 
policies  of  the  Japanese  government  towards  the  R&D  sector  may  have  been  beneficial  for 
competition  and  ultimately  innovation,  making  the  R&D  sector  one  of  the  highest  growth 
industries in Japan.    On the other hand, Beason and Weinstein (1996) argue that the Japanese 
government, including MITI, allocated a disproportionate amount of resources to low growth 
industries
8  They also find that the financial support by the government did not positively affect 
TFP. Thus, in either case, subsidization was not effective. 
MITI also avoided other types of policy distortions. Okimoto (1989) argues that after WWII, 
Japan discarded superpower aspirations. As a result, the Japanese government did not need to 
protect and promote defense-related industries, which meant that, contrary to other countries, the 
government did not spend substantial quantities on R&D investment in the defense industry. He 
also argues that the Japanese government de-emphasized the importance of national prestige. 
This implied that, unlike France and other European countries, MITI has not followed a strategy 
of cultivating one or two “national champions.” For example, Japan has had no Strategic Defense 
Initiative, supersonic jet, or airbus project. 
In  terms  of  intellectual  property  protection,  the  Japanese  patent  system  had  been 
traditionally beneficial to the user side. While a user-favorable patent system helps and promotes 
the imports of technologies in the adoption process, it is has been argued to be harmful to the 
innovation process. This is one of the reasons why patent rights in Japan were strengthened in 
1988 through a substantial patent reform. However, the benefits of such a reform are debatable, 
since Sakakibara and Branstetter (2001) show that the 1988 Japanese patent reform does not 
seem to have increased either R&D expenditures or product innovation. 
The endogenous growth theory emphasizes the importance of knowledge spillover in the 
process of the creation of new technologies. Since this kind of spillover is a type of externality, it 
is  thought  to  be  justified  for  governments  to  implement  policies  aimed  at  internalizing  the 
benefits of such knowledge spillover. One such policies is the establishment of R&D consortia. 
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In  theory,  the  internalization  of  the  spillover  externality,  through  R&D  consortia,  provides 
incentives for firms to innovate and create new technologies. MITI assisted in the formation of 
R&D consortia, or research projects, where potential competitive firms cooperated on the R&D 
of  targeted  technologies  and  shared  their  knowledge.
9  The  R&D  consortia  utilize  “the 
community enforcement mechanism in modern business societies in Japan” (Hayami, 2006). 
Probably, the most famous R&D consortium is the project on very large-scale integrated circuits. 
In  addition,  Okimoto  (1989)  argues  that  R&D  consortia,  which  facilitate  the  exchange  of 
research ideas, would have been more effective in Japan than in other countries, because in Japan, 
lifetime employment prevents the exchange of research ideas. However, R&D consortia may not 
always be effective means of promoting innovation. For instance, if participant firms compete in 
the product market, R&D consortia do not work well. Then, what was the performance of R&D 
consortia in Japan?   
Branstetter  and  Sakakibara  study  empirically  in  a  series  of  papers  the  effectiveness  of 
Japanese R&D consortia. They find that even after controlling for fixed effects, government 
subsidies  and  the  endogeneity  problem  of  nominating  participants,  involvement  in  R&D 
consortia increases member firms’ R&D expenditures and patent production (Branstetter and 
Sakakibara,  1998  and  2002).  They  also  find  that  similar  technological  knowledge  among 
participant firms tends to increase patent production (Branstetter and Sakakibara, 2002), but to 
decrease R&D expenditures (Sakakibara, 2001). 
It has been argued that financial support to R&D consortia is not entirely relevant to the 
success of an R&D consortium. Branstetter and Sakakibara (2002) note that, for instance, the 
design  of  an  R&D  consortium  is  more  important  to  its  success  than  the  level  of  resources 
expended on it. These results might indicate, that although government financial support for 
R&D consortia was modest in Japan (Sakakibara, 1997), their role may not have been negligible, 
since the government was involved in their conception.   
Contrary to the previous studies, Krugman and Obstfeld (2006) argue the negative impact of 
MITI’s policy on R&D consortia. When forming R&D consortia, MITI selects the projects with 
the most promising future. However, they argue that MITI failed to select the right industries to 
be  promoted.  They  say,  “The  semiconductor  industry  appeared,  on  its  face,  to  have  all  the 
attributes of a sector suitable for activist trade policy. But in the end it yielded neither strong 
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externalities nor excess returns” (p.266).   
Another policy that promotes the development and sharing of knowledge is the promotion of 
institutions  such  as  research  institutes  and  universities.  According  to  Okimoto  (1989),  the 
laboratories of Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Public Corporation, and its successor Nippon 
Telegraph and Telephone Corporation (NTT), have played an important role on R&D activities in 
Japan, as the American Telephone & Telegraph Company (AT&T) has done in the U.S. However, 
unlike AT&T, which used affiliated firms as its supplier, NTT itself procured all the materials 
from the market, which promoted technology diffusion between NTT and the suppliers. The 
university share of R&D expenditure, as a user, is similar to that of other developed countries 
(see Table 3). Despite the obvious potential for interaction, Okimoto and Nishi (1994) report that 
the relations between firms and universities have been traditionally small, which have limited the 
knowledge  sharing  between  these  two  important  types  of  developers  of  ideas.  Furthermore, 
Aldrich and Sasaki (1995) report that university-based R&D is not allowed in Japanese R&D 
consortia. All this suggests that university R&D in Japan has been conducted independently from 
that of the industry. .   
5. Technology adoption and innovation in the agricultural sector 
Unlike  in  the  non-agricultural  sector,  technology  adoption  is  not  easy  to  implement  in 
agriculture.  This  is  primarily  due  to  the  fact  that  agriculture  is  strongly  constrained  by 
environmental conditions, which makes it difficult to transfer advanced technologies developed 
in the temperate zone to the tropical zone (Hayami and Godo, 2005).   
The induced innovation theory by Hicks (1932) and Hayami and Ruttan (1971 and 1985) 
formalizes  an  idea  that  technological  innovations  are  directed  toward  technologies  that  use 
smaller amounts of relatively scarce production factors through price adjustment mechanisms.   
However, such innovations are not always possible with the effort of private farm producers 
alone, especially in the early stage of economics development, where market mechanisms do not 
necessarily  function  well  (Hayami  and  Godo,  2005).  Hence,  to  facilitate  TFP  growth  in 
agriculture  it  is  essential  to  develop  the  appropriate  adoptive  research,  along  with  the 
mechanisms  to  later  diffuse  the  new  technologies.  For  this  reason,  the  government  can 
potentially play a very important role in the agricultural sector. Indeed, many governments have 
set  up  both  research  stations  to  develop  new  knowledge,  as  well  as  extension  stations  to 
encourage the use of this research (Rustichini and Schmitz, 1991). Indeed, Japan was the first 24 
economy in the world to develop high-yielding varieties of crops complementary to the heavy 
use  of  fertilizer,  and  also  the  first  to  develop  chemical  fertilizers  (Flath,  2005;  Hayami  and 
Ruttan, 1970). 
In Japan, modern technological progress in the agricultural sector has taken place in two 
phases, the prewar and postwar eras. During the prewar era, Japan achieved rapid TFP growth of 
agricultural production. As Hayami (1975) notes, this rapid growth in the initial growth phase 
was supported by a backlog of technological potential accumulated before the Meiji era, when 
superior methods and advanced knowledge were embodied in practices of the wealthy veteran 
farmers (Rounou) in the leading position in their villages. After the Meiji Restoration, these 
veteran farm leaders started identifying and disseminating their knowledge across regions. The 
government helped the exploitation and diffusion of the backlog of indigenous technologies by 
sponsoring ” seed-exchange  meetings”  and  ”agricultural  discussion  meetings”  and  promoting 
scientific agricultural-research and extension activities (Minami, 1994). These activities were 
also  complemented  through  irrigation  investments  by  the  government  and  their  maintenance 
performed by the neighboring communities. The introduction of modern communication and 
transportation systems, including the postal service and railway, was also important (Hayami, 
1975). 
Agricultural TFP improvement in the early postwar rapid growth period, shown in Table 1, 
was the consequence of the implementation of many of the technological advancements that had 
been accumulated during the prewar period, and in many instances during the war (Hayami and 
Ruttan,  1985).  TFP  growth  in  the  postwar  years  played  an  essential  role  in  the  increase  of 
agricultural output growth (Hayami, 1975; Kuroda, 1995, 1997).   
Traditionally, it has been argued that the postwar TFP growth in the agricultural sector has 
come  from  two  main  sources:  the  mechanization  of  agriculture,  and  the  introduction  of 
high-yield varieties of farm products. During the rapid growth era, mini-tractorization based on 
innovations  and  the  adoption  of  small-scale  machinery  became  an  important  factor  of 
agricultural growth. In this process, the research conducted during the war for non-agricultural 
purposes formed a backlog used in the advancements of agricultural techniques (Hayami, 1975). 
Related to the advantages of using these newer technologies, Lau and Yotopoulos (1989) show 
that there is a positive association between scale economies and tractorization, and Hayami and 
Kawagoe  (1989)  find  that  increasing  returns  of  agricultural  production  emerged  in  Japan  as 
agriculture  developed,  and  they  were  accompanied  by  sharp  wage  increases  during  the 25 
mid-1960s. These increasing returns and rises in wages occurred because of the substitution of 
large-scale machineries, such as riding tractors, for small hand-pushed ones.   
In  order  to  assess  the  validity  of  the  traditional  view,  Kuroda  (1995)  decomposes  TFP 
changes into the scale economy factor and the technological improvement factor. He finds that, 
on average, 90% of the TFP growth rate for the period 1960-90 is explained by technological 
improvements, and 10% by scale economies. This implies that the introduction of high-yield 
variety of farm products, such as the biological and chemical aspects of rice technologies, is 
more  important  than  mechanization  in  explaining  the  agriculture  TFP  growth  in  the  initial 
postwar Japan. 
It has been argued that the Japanese government played an important role in this process of 
agricultural  technological  improvement.  In  particular,  the  R&E  efforts  of  the  Ministry  of 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery (MAFF) resulted in the development of new rice varieties, 
both from the pureline and crossbred “Norin” selections.
  10  These R&E activities were crucial in 
the  early  postwar  period  because  they  allowed  for  the  reduction  of  costs  in  agricultural 
production. However, the effect of R&E on TFP growth dramatically decreased after the late 
1960s, despite the fact that the level of R&E investment did not decrease. The diminished impact 
of R&E on TFP growth is what Kuroda (1997) identifies as the main source of the agricultural 
TFP growth slowdown after 1969. 
6. Domestic diffusion of technology 
The previous sections have focused on the role of the Japanese government on the adoption 
of foreign technologies, as well as the development of new ones. As most of the models reviewed 
in Section 2 show, the engine behind long-run economic growth is the adoption and creation of 
new technologies. However, all these models assume that once a new technology is developed, 
or imported from overseas, it is readily available to use by any firm willing to pay its price. 
While this perfect and instantaneous diffusion of technology may be a reasonable simplification 
for these models, in reality technologies and know-how do not immediately diffuse within a 
country. Indeed, using a numerical dynamic general equilibrium model with endogenous TFP, 
Oshima (2009) shows that a major part of TFP growth in Japan’s postwar rapid growth era can 
be explained by domestic knowledge diffusion. In this section we study the factors that affect the 
domestic  diffusion  of  existing  technologies  and  the  role  of  the  Japanese  government  in  this 
                                                   
10  Norin is the Japanese acronym of MAFF. 26 
process. 
Several factors have been pointed out in the literature as being important to understand the 
local  diffusion  of  technology.  Some  of  them  are  similar  to  those  noted  as  determining  its 
international diffusion, and include such factors as the level and distribution of human capital, 
quality of infrastructures and enforcement of patent laws. 
The level of human capital is an important lubricant for the diffusion of technologies. Once a 
new technology is imported or invented, for it to be widely used, workers in firms need to be 
able to learn how to use it. The ability of the labor force to learn and implement new techniques 
is strongly linked to the educational level of a country. Godo and Hayami (2002) compared the 
progress of education between Japan and the U.S. in the period from 1890–1990, finding that 
while Japan greatly caught up with the U.S. in terms of education in the prewar period, there was 
a missing link between improvements in education and the macro performance of Japan. This 
missing link can be clearly observed in the postwar period, when Japan rapidly caught up with 
the U.S. in terms of per capita GDP, although the catching up process in terms of schooling was 
much less dramatic. They argue that the weak contemporaneous correlation between education 
and TFP growth in the postwar period is due to the fact that what was important in the diffusion 
of  technologies  after  the  war  was  the  available  educational  level,  rather  than  its  current 
improvements. In particular, they state that it was the sharp increase in Japanese vocational 
training prior to 1940 that was critical to the diffusion of technologies in the 1950s and 1960s, 
therefore making education affect TFP only with a lag. 
The government has implemented several policies that have been important to increase the 
human  capital level  of  Japan.  It  introduced  mandatory  elementary  education  in  the  late  19
th 
century, made tuition free in 1900, and started to implement vocational training programs as 
early as 1893. It also provided certificates for technicians through exams, such as “Ginou Kentei 
Seido” of the Ministry of Health, Welfare, and Labor, introduced in 1959, which helped workers 
move across jobs and diffuse the existing technologies. 27 
Figure 7: Average Years of Schooling in Japan and the US 
 
Source: Godo and Hayami (2002) 
It is widely accepted that physical infrastructure plays an important role in the process of 
economic development. One way it has been argued to help is by facilitating the diffusion and 
adoption of technological advancements. Since the classical works of development theory such 
as Hirschman (1958) and Rosenstein-Rodan (1943), development economists have considered 
infrastructure  as  an  indispensable  precondition  of  industrialization.  A  government’s 
industrialization program would be successful when physical infrastructure is shared among the 
firms and investors, since the coordination of various investments generates strong pecuniary 
externalities, which is identified as the key to successful industrialization (Murphy, Shleifer and 
Vishny,  1989,  and  Ciccone  and  Matsuyama,  1996).  In  facilitating  the  domestic  diffusion  of 
technologies,  the  Japanese  government  played  an  important  role  by  providing  physical 
infrastructures such as the postal system, telecommunications, railways, and paved roads and 
highways (Kohsaka, Yoshino, and Nakahigashi, 2007). For instance, the government built the 
transportation infrastructure crucial for the delivery of materials that were needed to implement 
the BOF technology explained in Section 4.2 (Okazaki, 2001).   
In  diffusing  borrowed  technologies  imported  from  foreign  advanced  countries,  or  those 
domestically developed, imitation through industrial clusters may have also been important. As 
an example of technology spillovers in clusters, Yamamura, Sonobe, and Otsuka (2005) examine 
the evolution of the motorcycle industry in Japan from 1948 to 1964. Using individual firm data, 
they show that the industry’s rapid growth of the early phase is explained by the massive entry 28 
and imitation of simple technologies. On the other hand, the sustained growth of the later phases 
is explained by the domestic innovations and subsequent imitations by other local firms, as well 
as the exit of inefficient firms. Sonobe and Otsuka (2006) found similar patterns in different 
industries in Japan and other East Asian countries.   
The motorcycle industry example of Yamamura et al. (2005) also highlights the role of the 
government as the enactor and enforcer of patent laws, since most of the industry’s growth is 
explained  by  the  imitation  of  the  competitor’s  technology.  Japan’s  patent  system  somehow 
allows these types of imitation patterns. It is a system that promotes easy opposition to patents 
before they are even issued. As pointed out by Flath (2005), this provides incentives to firms to 
license their new inventions on terms favorable to users, and encourages the early revelation of 
new technologies. 
7. Concluding remarks 
In this paper we have shown that the growth of aggregate TFP in postwar Japan was mainly 
driven by that of non-agricultural TFP, although agricultural TFP also played an important role in 
the structural transformation of employment, which precipitated industrialization. The Japanese 
government  played  a  role  in  the  technological  growth  of  both  sectors,  and  its  contributions 
comprise both financial support and the necessary organizational infrastructure. 
The high growth of non-agricultural TFP in the postwar period was driven initially by the 
adoption of foreign technologies and later by the innovation of domestically developed ones. 
Most of the initial adoption of technologies was done through licensing by Japanese firms under 
the strict supervision of the government. The government influenced the types and quantities of 
technologies  imported  by  setting  a  very  restrictive  process  for  the  approval  of  the  foreign 
technologies that were allowed to be imported. The government’s share of R&D in Japan is 
smaller than in other developed countries. However the government has been highly involved in 
the establishment of R&D consortia. This suggests that the role of the Japanese government in 
the innovation phase has been primarily to not distort the incentives of innovating firms through 
subsidies, and to enhance coordination through R&D consortia. 
In the agricultural sector, TFP growth was driven mostly by innovations of new technologies. 
The  mechanization  of  agriculture  through  locally  invented  mini-tractors,  as  well  as  the 
development of high-yield varieties of farm products have been argued to be behind the growth 
in agricultural TFP. The government’s participation in this process was crucial since many of 
these high-yield varieties were developed directly by the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and 29 
Fishery. 
In  terms  of  diffusing  both  imported  and  locally  developed  technologies,  the  Japanese 
government helped by increasing the human capital level of the economy, building many of the 
necessary physical infrastructures, and by setting up a patent system that is fairly favorable to 
imitators. 
In summary, the Japanese government played a part in the growth of TFP in the rapid growth 
era by directing the adoption of foreign technologies, promoting coordination of R&D activities, 
and setting up ways in which available technology could be diffused across the country.    Yet, 
we  should  also  note  that  Japanese  government  was  not  immune  to  its  failure.    Indeed,  the 
government failed to foresee the importance of higher education in the post catch-up growth era.   
Japan was not successful to accumulate high level of knowledge due to insufficient investments 
in  tertiary  or  post-graduate  education,  therefore  intangible  capital  intensive  technological 
progress  was  not  fully  induced  (Hayami  and  Godo,  2009).    This  unsuccessful  induced 
innovation is consistent with the low TFP growth of the 1990s.   30 
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